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I. Introduction
The transition to very wide bands in the EMS has evoked interest
in the origin of the speculative forces that led to the breakdown
of the old system. The traditional literature on speculative
attacks [Krugman 1979, Flood and Garber 1984, Obstfeld 1986,
Wyplosz 1986, Grilli 1986] stresses the role of divergent paths
for domestic credit and inflation. It seems, however, difficult
to attribute the collapse of pegged rates among the core EMS
countries to differences in money growth or inflation trends.
In this paper we shall pursue a different approach which focuses
on the link between exchange-rate expectations and capacity uti-
lisation in an adjustable peg system. We show that such a link
helps to explain why Belgium, Denmark and France were subject to
substantial speculative exchange-rate pressure which caused them
to abandon the close peg to the D-Mark, while the Netherlands
were not.
The paper is organised as follows. In part II we analyse the mac-
roeconomic effects of speculative exchange-rate pressure in a
sticky-price model. In part III we address modifications that are
brought about by real-wage resistance. In part IV we endogenise
exchange-rate expectations by relating them to the degree of
capacity utilisation. In part V we give an empirical account of
the link between capacity utilisation and exchange-rate adjust-
ments for core EMS-countries. Part VI contains some policy con-
clusions .II. Speculative Exchange-Rate Pressure in a Sticky-Price Model
To analyse the effects of speculative exchange-rate pressure we
use a discrete-time version of the small-country model suggested
by Dornbusch [1976].
Goods market equilibrium is given by
(1) yt = - a rfc + b (efc + p* - Pt> + c y* + gfc,
where y. denotes output, r. the nominal interest rate, e. the no-
minal exchange rate, p the producer price level and g. a fiscal
parameter; an asterisk indicates a foreign variable. All variab-
les except for r. are stated in logarithms. The term in brackets
represents the real exchange rate.
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Money market equilibrium is given by
(2) mfc - pt = k yt - 1 rfc,
where m,•is the log of the domestic money supply.
Prices are assumed to adjust sluggishly to excess demand
(3
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where y. denotes the log of potential output.












where e.+^ represents the log of the exchange rate which is ex-
pected for the next period, s. denotes the share of domestic
bonds in a minimum risk portfolio and s is the actual portfolio
share of domestic bonds. The last term in equation (4) reflects
the so-called risk premium. The coefficient j depends on the de-
gree of risk aversion [Dornbusch 1983]. With risk neutrality, j
is zero so that the last term drops out. With risk-averse behavi-
our, j is positive so that measures which increase the share of
domestic bonds in private portfolios tend to raise domestic inte-
rest rates.Setting y. , s and all foreign variables equal to zero and sub-
stituting (4) into (1) we obtain
(5) yt = -a (et + 1 - efc> + b (efc - Pfc) + gfc - a j s^
We assume that initially the economy is in equilibrium and no
exchange-rate change is expected, i.e. e. + - = e. .
Let us now consider what happens when expectations change exoge-
nously. Suppose that market participants expect the foreign cur-
rency to appreciate so that e.+. rises. As can be.seen from equa-
tion (5) a rise in et+i/ with fixed exchange rates and with pri-
ces that are initially given, will cause a fall in output. This
can be explained by the fact that the expectation of a deprecia-
tion of the domestic currency and the resulting speculative pres-
sure in the financial market cause a rise in the interest rate
which lowers demand for domestic products. Over time, the emer-
gence of an output gap will result in a lowering of the price
level and a real depreciation which in turn raises demand, until
full employment output is restored.
2
The policy relevance of a change in exchange-rate expectations
would be low, if the change were reversed quickly. In fact, a
frequent response of central banks to speculative pressure has
been to allow the domestic interest rate to shift up, hoping that
market participants, when learning that the expected appreciation
of the foreign currency has not occurred, will revise their ex-
pectations and allow the interest rate to be lowered again soon
so that the disturbance to demand whould be short-lived. Histori-
cal experience with reference to the so-called peso problem [De
Grauwe 1989, p. 1291 or more recent experience in the context of
the EMS has, however, shown that the defense of fixed exchange
rates may require the maintainance of an interest differential
for an extended period of time.
The expectation of a devaluation may, thus, put a country into a
policy dilemma. If it gives priority to external stability and
keeps the exchange rate fixed, it will go through a recession.The government could consider to escape the recession through an
expansionary fiscal policy, i.e. a rise in g.. But with high pub-
lic sector deficits the room for an expansionary fiscal policy is
often considered small or non-existent. Another possible response
consists in lowering the share of domestic currency bonds in pri-
vate portfolios. A standard measure in this context is sterilised
intervention: the central bank sells foreign-currency assets or
takes a foreign-currency loan, buys domestic currency in the ex-
change market and uses the proceeds to aquire domestic currency
assets, thereby reducing their share in private portfolios. But
with low risk aversion, the volume of the required operations may
exceed the amount that authorities are willing to accept.
3
The only remaining measure to avoid the recession, then, is to
raise e.., i.e. to depreciate the domestic currency. In the case
of consideration it may be interesting to note that the required
depreciation would fall short of bringing the rate up to e.+..
For if e. were raised to e. . , the resulting depreciation would
cause' an excess demand for domestic output. Formally, the nominal
appreciation of the foreign currency which restores goods market
equilibrium is given by
(6)
This result may be related to the discussion on self-fulfilling
speculative attacks tObstfeld 1986; Eichengreen and Wyplosz,
1993; Goldstein et al. 19931. In the case which is considered
here, the expectation of a depreciation may cause a devaluation;
but the devaluation, if it occurs, is less pronounced than expec-
ted by the market participants.
The present model can also be used to analyse the effects of the
formation of a monetary union which removes existing expectations
of future exchange-rate changes. Suppose that initially the
domestic currency is expected to depreciate. Now a monetary union
is formed with irrevocably fixed exchange rates. As a result, the
expected future exchange rate adjusts to the current rate and the
domestic interest rate declines to the foreign interest ratelevel. With initial equilibrium in the goods market the drop in
the interest rate tends to raise output above its potential
thereby triggering a transitory increase in the price level. To
avoid transitory inflation, the decision for the monetary union
would have to go along with a simultaneous decision to revalue
the domestic currency, so that the stimulating effect of the
reduction in interest rates is immediately neutralised by the
dampening effect of the real appreciation.
III. Real Wage Resistance
Op to now we have assumed that potential output itself is not
affected by the expectation of a depreciation. This may not be
true in the case of real wage resistance [Bruno and Sachs, 1985].
If a worsening of the terms of trade causes higher nominal wages
and, hence, higher producer real wages, potential output tends to
be negatively affected by changes in the real exchange rate:
(7) yt = - n (efc + p* - pt) n > 0.
As can be seen, the expectation of a depreciation which raises
the real exchange rate and tends to lower potential output. Thus,
in the fixed exchange rate case, prices will fall less and output
will not return to its initial equilibrium.
In a similar vein, a drop in output which is caused by specula-
tive exchange-rate pressure cannot be totally prevented by a de-
preciation. The depreciation which restores goods market equi-
librium is given by A y = A yfc and, using equations (5) and (7):
(8) - n A efc = - a ( A et + 1 - Aet> + bAefc
Ae
t a + b + n ** t + 1"
Comparing equations (6) and (8) we find that the nominal depre-
ciation is smaller in the case of real wage resistance.In contrast to the analysis in part II, the effect of an expected
depreciation on output is not transitory but permanent, since
potential output falls to a lower level. Still, by nominally
depreciating the currency rather than keeping it at the initial
level the authorities can at least prevent output from falling
below its reduced potential level.
IV. Capacity-Linked Exchange-Rate Expectations
So far we have considered the case of speculative pressure which
results from an exogenous change in expectations about the future
exchange rate. In this section we shall extend the analysis by
making exchange-rate expectations themselves depend on the state
of the domestic economy. In particular, we want to take account
of the fact that speculative attacks in the EMS did not occur in
a situation of fully utilised capacity, as has been assumed in
the previous section, but came about in a period of recession.
The attractiveness of a depreciation results from its ability to
avoid or shorten a recession which otherwise would occur due to
the sluggish adjustment of domestic prices. As long as there is
full capacity utilisation, the country does not have an incentive
to depreciate. With output falling short of potential output, the
incentive to depreciate increases. This may be reflected in ex-
pectations of market participants: the expected future exchange
rate depends on the output gap.
Formally, this may be stated aa:
(9) et+1 = efc + q v <y - yt>,
where v (y. - y. ) reflects the exchange-rate change that in the
view of market participants is required to adjust actual output
to potential output and q is the probability that this exchange-
rate change will occur. Using equations (9), (4) and (1) and set-
ting g , y. and the risk premium equal to zero we obtain(10) yfc = a q v yfc + b (efc + p* - pfc) - a r* + c y*







With rational expectations the expected exchange-rate change that
is required to close the output gap is equal to the actual requi-
red change which is given from (10) so that
(11) v A yt =
 1 " t
 q
 v AY ,
L. U L,
where A y. denotes the change in output that is required to close
an existing gap. This equation implies that
(12) v = (1/b) - (a q v/b)
= (l/b)/(l + a q/b) = l/(b + a q).
Substituting the expression for v into (10) one obtains
b ^ c y* - a r* + b p*
Equation (13) shows that the effect of a foreign shock on the
domestic economy in an adjustable peg system may differ from that
in a rigidly pegged system. With irreversibly fixed rates, the
probability of an exchange-rate change, and hence q and z, are
zero. In an adjustable peg system with a non-zero probability of
an exchange-rate adjustment to close an emerging output gap, q is
positive. This implies that a change in foreign output, interest
rates or prices has a stronger effect on the domestic economy
than under a rigid peg. The lack of credibility of a stated
exchange-rate target, therefore, tends to strengthen the trans-
mission of a foreign disturbance. A recession abroad, for
example, which affects domestic output negatively via reduced
exports, in this case also creates the expectation of a devalua-
tion of the domestic currency which in turn raises domestic inte-
rest rates above foreign rates and reduces output further.
The probability of an exchange-rate adjustment is likely to re-
flect historical policy reactions. Thus, q tends to be relativelyhigh for countries where authorities in the past have devalued
the currency when capacity utilisation fell or reached a critical
value, as compared to countries which have not done so.*
V. Capacity Dtilisation and Exchange-Rate Adjustment in Core EMS-
Countries
Figure 1 gives an empirical illustration of the link between
capacity utilisation and exchange-rate adjustments in core EMS-
countries outside of Germany.
5 As can be seen, each of the coun-
tries devalued its currency vis-a-vis the D-Mark when the capa-
city utilisation rate reached a particularly low level. Belgium
and France also devalued their currencies twice (in 1981 and
1983) when capacity utilisation was falling markedly. Denmark
shows a different cyclical pattern than the other three countries
and devalued its currency along with Belgium and France even in
peak years such as 1986/87. Thus, the historical record for the
listed countries could be sketched as follows: the Netherlands
only devalue when capacity utilisation reaches a very low level;
Belgium and France devalue when capacity utilisation is on a very
low level or falls markedly; Denmark devalues when capacity uti-
lisation reaches a very low level or when other core countries
devalue.
This historical experience may help to explain why Belgium, Den-
mark and France decided to abandon the close peg to the D-Mark in
summer 1993, while the Netherlands did not. During the tranquil
period between 1987 and 1992, none of the mentioned criteria for
the respective countries signaled a depreciation. This changed in
1992 and particularly in 1993 when capacity utilisation dropped
substantially in France and Belgium (traditionally a potential
signal for a devaluation which Denmark would then join) and when
capacity utilisation in all these three countries approached the
trough of the eighties (another potential signal for a devalua-
tion). In contrast, capacity utilisation in the Netherlands in
1993 was still substantially above the level that had been ob-
served in connection with the previous realignment, so that thereFigure 1


























°A circle denotes realignments or a widening of the exchange-rate bond vis-a-vis
the D-Mark.
Source: OECD, own calculations10
was no signal for a devaluation. Thus, the speculative attack
against the Belgian franc, the French franc and the Danish crown
can be explained by the historical links between capacity utili-
sation and exchange-rate adjustment and their effect on the
expectation of market participants.
Figure 1 also shows that the downturn of the Dutch economy in the
period 1992-93 has been less pronounced than that of the other
three countries. One plausible reason is the absence of capacity
related speculative pressure. As the above model has shown, the
effects of a common external shock, such as a rise in German
interest rates or a German recession, should be more pronounced
when capacity utilisation affects exchange-rate expectations.
Thus, the decline of capacity utilisation in Belgium, Denmark and
France was intensified by the emerging expectation of a deprecia-
tion which drove-up interest rates and reduced demand even more,
in contrast to the Netherlands where interest rates stayed close
to the German level.
VI. Policy Conclusions
Currently, there is a debate about the appropriate time for a
return to narrow bands in the EMS. The preceding analysis has two
implications for this discussion. First, it has been shown that
the EMS is particularly vulnerable to speculative exchange-rate
pressure when capacity utilisation is low. Thus, a return to nar-
row bands should not occur before a substantial improvement in
capacity utilisation has taken place. Second, the analysis has
demonstrated that an adjustable peg system is more vulnerable to
exogenous demand shocks than a regime of rigidly pegged or floa-
ting exchange rates. Thus, the question arises: Why return to an
adjustable peg system with narrow bands at all?
One argument says that exchange-rate flexibility among EC-curren-
cies should be retained but changes of rates ought to require the
consent of other EC-countries in order to prevent a competitive
depreciation. This is the classical argument for an adjustable-11
peg system. Experience in recent decades, however, has shown that
competitive depreciation did not pose an actual policy problem.
In fact, EMS countries that moved to floating rates or wider
exchange-rate bands have tried to dampen rather than to enforce
depreciation of their currencies vis-a-vis the D-Mark. Moreover,
even if competitive depreciations were a problem, the EMS could
not prevent them since it is possible for a country to leave the
exchange-rate mechanism without facing sanctions.
A second argument says that the return to narrow bands is a pre-
condition for the transition to irrevocably fixed rates in the
context of the European Monetary Union (EMU). The Maastricht
treaty, however, does not mention participation in a narrow band
exchange-rate mechanism as a criterion for membership in the EMU.
What it says is that countries should have kept their currency in
the normal exchange-rate band which, however, has in the meantime
been widened to 30 percent. Thus, the decisions of summer 1993
have de facto abolished the exchange-rate criterion for a transi-
tion to EMU. As our analysis in part II shows, this criterion is
questionable anyhow, since the appropriate exchange rate for
joining a monetary union may differ from the exchange rate which
was maintained previously under an adjustable peg.12
Appendix
If goods demand depends on real interest rates rather than nomi-
nal interest rates, equation (1) in the text changes to
(Al) yt = - a (rfc - <pfc + 1 - Pfc)) + b (efc • p* - pt) + c y* + gfc.
With sluggish adjustment of prices and rational expectations, the
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Substituting equations (A2) and (4) into (Al) and setting
Yut 9t> Yt- P£»
 rt
 an<J j <
 st "
 st' equal to zero, goods market
equilibrium is given by
(A3) yfc = - u <efc+1 - efc) + w <efc - pfc),
with u = a/(l -ah) and w = b/(l - a h>.
Assuming that 1 - a h > 0, a rise in e.+- will lead to an initial
fall in output as is the case when demand for goods depends on
nominal interest rates. The initial rise in the real interest
rate is larger than the rise in the nominal interest rate because
the drop in output causes an expectation of a falling price
level. Over time, the decline in prices and the resulting real




1 In the appendix we show that the results which are derived•in
this part of the paper also hold, if demand for goods depends on
the real interest rate rather than the nominal interest rate.
2 It is worth noting that during the transition period inflation
in the country which faces depreciation pressure is lower than
abroad - a phenomenon which could be observed recently for seve-
ral EMS countries whose currencies were under pressure vis-a-vis
the D-Mark although their inflation rates were below the German
level.
3 This limitation is confirmed by the recent experience in the
EMS. Obviously, authorities are reluctant to fight speculative
attacks on their currencies by taking large net-debtor positions
in foreign currency. One reason is that such a position may make
a future depreciaton prohibitively costly [Sohmen 1969], and
hence imply the irrevocable loss of the country's monetary auto-
nomy. For the remaining part of this paper we shall assume that
j = 0, so that aspects of portfolio composition can be neglected.
* It is also possible that the probability of an appreciation in
case of excess capacity utilisation is not the same as the proba-
bility of a depreciation in case of underutilised capacity. More-
over, the probability may also depend on the expected durability
of the shocks: the probability of an exchange-rate change is
likely to be lower when the shocks are expected to be short-
lived. Thus, the expectation that, say, foreign interest rates
will fall tends to reduce the probability that the domestic coun-
try will resort to a depreciation to remove an existing output
gap. On the other hand, a cut in foreign interest rates which
falls short of an expected change may increase the probability of
a depreciation and raise the domestic interest rate. This could
push capacity utilisation below a critical level, with the result
that the currency is devalued.
5 Capacity utilisation is set equal to 100 in 1990. Growth of
potential output is calculated as the average growth rate in the
period 1980 - 1990.14
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